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Abstract 
How serious is the trade-off between economic growth and other social welfare indicators? In this 
paper, we investigate whether the recent extreme economic growth in China has improved social 
welfare when considering not only income but also the environment and medical care. We 
construct an analytical framework based on multidimensional majorization which allows us to 
evaluate welfare orderings based on multivariate attributes. For the period from 2006 to 2010, we 
investigate the welfare orderings of multivariate distributions of attributes compiled from city 
statistics in China. The result shows that social well-being in 2010 is better than 2006. However, 
pairs other than {2006, 2010} are not rankable. In particular, we find that pollution emissions are a 
bottleneck that hinders improving social welfare. On the other hand, recent changes in the 
distributions of GDP and of medical resources work toward improving social well-being. 
Keywords: regional inequality in China; multidimensional majorization; welfare ordering 
JEL classification codes: D3; D63; R12. 
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1 Introduction 
In the process of economic growth, various distortions appear while national income as a whole 
expands. Firstly, per capita income among regions does not necessarily grow at the same rate. As a 
result of economic growth, regional income disparity may increase. Secondly, in an economic 
growth with rapid industrialization, we sometimes face serious environmental degradation. Indeed, 
developed countries have experienced various pollution problems in the process of economic growth. 
Thirdly, economic growth accompanying a transition from planned to a market economy brings a 
lack of social security services such as medical care and social insurance. 
In order to evaluate the performance achieved by economic growth, it is not sufficient to 
focus on the income or the growth rate as a whole. Not only monetary income but also the factors 
noted above play key roles as determinants of welfare. In this paper, we investigate whether the 
recent extreme economic growth in China has improved social welfare when considering not only 
income but also the environment and medical care. That is, taking per capita GDP, environmental 
quality, and the endowment of medical resources as attributes affecting individuals’ utility, we 
compare social welfare based on data from Chinese cities.  
To this end, we compare the distribution of attributes by using an extended version of the 
generalized Lorenz (GL) dominance criterion proposed by Shorrocks (1983) and Kakwani (1984). 1  
GL dominance is an appropriate criterion for analyzing the Chinese economy which shows both 
rapid economic growth and increased inequality since it takes into account not only inequality but 
also changes in the mean. Extending GL to multidimensional attributes, we evaluate recent trends in 
Chinese regional inequalities from a social welfare point of view. 
Needless to say, reducing regional inequality is an important policy issue for the Chinese 
government.2  Figure 1 shows the trend of regional inequality in income measured by per capita 
GDP by province. After the mid-70's, the regional inequality tended to decline for the 10 years that 
included the early stages of the open door policy. However, regional inequality increased from 1990 
to 2003. The Gini index in 2003 in particular has indicated the highest value except for period of 
confusion caused by the Great Leap Forward and the famine period. Although inequality has been 
declining since 2003, it still remains high compared with the conditions in the late-80's. 
The Chinese government has promoted the development policy in inland areas such as 
Great Western Development in order to reduce economic disparity. Also, substantial amount of 
income has been transferred to reduce income inequality between urban and rural areas. However, 
the basic structure of Chinese regional inequality has not changed. Table 1 summarizes the 20 cities 
with highest per capita GDP and those with lowest per capita GDP. Although the statistics are based 
on cities rather than provinces, they have similar tendencies. The cities and provinces with low GDP 
are mainly located in inland areas. On the other hand, the cities with high per capita GDP are in the 
                                                        
1 . For a detail discussion, see also Lambert (1993, ch.3). For a detailed discussion of the Lorenz-type 
multidimensional dominance criteria, see Savaglio (2006) and Trannoy (2006).  
2.     For a comprehensive study on China's inequality, see Gustafsson et al.(2008). 
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northeastern and coastal areas. At the same time, there are is a province, namely Gansu, where there 
are cities from both the lowest GDP and highest GDP lists. This fact suggests that regional 
disparities in economic activity in China should be investigated in more detail than at the provincial 
level.   
 
 
Figure 1 Interprovincial income inequality trend 
Source: China Compendium of Statistics 1949-2008.  
Notes: Hainan province is excluded from the sample. Generalized entropy index, ܩܧሺ0ሻ, is defined as ܩܧሺ0ሻ ൌ
∑ ௜݂ln	ሺߤ ݕ௜⁄ ሻ௜ , where ௜݂, ݕ௜, and ߤ denote the population share in province i, per capita GDP in province i, and 
average per capita GDP, respectively. 
 
Reflecting concern about regional inequality, there is much extant literature even if we 
restrict our attention to just income inequality. In addition, several studies focus on inequalities other 
than income such as the environment, health status, education and social security. In what follows, 
we summarize the related literature to clarify our motivation. 
Tsui (1991, 1993, 1996, and 1998) contributed pioneering work on regional inequality in 
China.3 For example, using the Gini index, the coefficient of variation and the entropy index, Tsui 
(1996) investigated the interprovincial GDP inequality from 1978 to 1989. He revealed that the 
growth-oriented policy toward coastal areas in the late 80s caused an expansion of income inequality, 
even though in the early stages of the open door policy the inequality has been shrank. In addition, 
decomposing the overall inequality into sectors, he found that reform in the industrial sector 
implemented by the open door policy resulted in increased interprovincial inequality.4 
                                                        
3.   In this paper, we focus on the regional income inequality based on the difference in per capita GDP. On the other 
hand, Gustafson et al. (2008) investigates the inequality using household survey data set of Chinese household 
income (CHIP) conducted in 1988, 1995, and 2002. 
4.  Kanbur and Zhang (2005) conducted a long term analysis that includes the period before the open door policy. 
They considered interprovincial-income-inequality based on GDP from 1952 to 2000 using Gini and generalized 
entropy indices. This calculated inequality is decomposed into rural-urban inequality and coastal-inland 
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Table 1 Per capita GDP in Chinese cities (2010) 
 Lowest 20 cities  Highest 20 cities 
 City Province Per capita GDP
a) City Province Per capita GDP a)
1 Dingxi Gansu 0.578 1 Karamay Xinjiang 18.193 
2 Longnan Gansu 0.660 2 Ordos Inner Mongolia 13.620 
3 Zhaotong Yunnan 0.728 3 Dongying Shandong 11.595 
4 Guyuan Ningxia  0.847 4 Daqing Heilongjiang 9.985 
5 Bazhong Sichuan 0.855 5 Baotou Inner Mongolia 9.285 
6 Lincang Yunnan 0.893 6 Shenzhen Guangdong 9.250 
7 Tianshui Gansu 0.920 7 Wuxi Jiangsu 9.091 
8 Fuyang Anhui 0.950 8 Suzhou Jiangsu 8.818 
9 Pu'er Yunnan 0.976 9 Guangzhou Guangdong 8.463 
10 Anshun Guizhou 1.014 10 Jiayuguan Gansu 7.950 
11 Shaoyang Hunan 1.028 11 Foshan Guangdong 7.856 
12 Baoshan Yunnan 1.041 12 Zhuhai Guangdong 7.746 
13 Bozhou Anhui 1.057 13 Dalian Liaoning 7.710 
14 Pingliang Gansu 1.121 14 Shanghai 7.457 
15 Lijiang Yunnan 1.153 15 Wuhai Inner Mongolia 7.340 
16 Lu'an Anhui  1.205 16 Beijing 7.196 
17 Suzhou Anhui  1.215 17 Tianjin 7.130 
18 Shangluo Shaanxi 1.221 18 Weihai Shandong 6.933 
19 Ankang Shaanxi 1.244 19 Hangzhou Zhejiang 6.838 
20 Wuwei Gansu 1.260 20 Ningbo Zhejiang 6.788 
Source: China City Statistical Yearbook 2011 and 2010 Population Census. 
Note: a) Ten thousand CNY (current price). 
 
Based on Tsui (1983), Lee (2000) investigated regional inequality by using data on 
consumption and production in the industrial and agricultural sectors and decomposed overall 
inequality. As a result, Lee (2000) found that sources of inequality can shift from interprovincial to 
intra-provincial and from rural-urban to intra-rural areas. Fan and Sun (2008) investigated 
interprovincial income inequality as measured by the coefficient of variation, the Gini index, and the 
Theil index and decomposed inequality at a sub-national level (the eastern, central, and western 
regions). They found that interregional inequality has increased while intraregional inequality has 
dropped. They also pointed out that regional inequality tends to increase and that intraregional 
inequality in the eastern region significantly affects overall inequality.5 
Inequality exacerbated by rapid growth affects another aspect of individuals’ well-being. 
Environmental quality has deteriorated grievously in industrial areas.6 Figure 2 represents sulfur 
dioxide (SO2) emissions per land area and per capita GDP in the prefecture-level cities and direct-
controlled municipalities. Although there are large deviations, cities with higher income have 
                                                                                                                                               
inequality. They also argued that the inequality can be explained by the share of heavy industry, the degree of 
decentralization, and market openness. 
5.  While much of the literature focusing on decomposing of overall inequality used the Theil index, which allows 
inter-group inequality to be distinguished from intra-group inequality, Wan (2001) investigated regional 
inequality by making use of the Gini index, decomposing it using the concentration index. 
6.   For example, see World Bank (2010). 
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substantially more SO2 emissions which may indicate tradeoff between the environment and 
economic growth. Vennemo et al. (2009) argued that air pollution in China, especially in the 
industrial areas of the northern and central regions, causes serious environmental problems. In the 
11th five-year plan, China's government, facing serious environmental damage, has set compulsory 
targets for environmental protection (e.g. Cao et al., 2009). 
 
Figure 2  Per capita GDP and industrial SO2 emissions in Chinese cities (2010) 
Note: Observations are prefecture-level cities except for Lhasa in Tibet, and direct-controlled municipalities. 
Sources: China City Statistical Yearbook 2011 and 2010 Population Census. 
 
Brajer et al. (2010) explicitly related regional income inequality with environmental quality 
in China. By using city data from 1995 and 2004, they estimated income adjusted by environmental 
quality, which takes into account health damage due to SO2 and NOx. Comparing adjusted income 
and unadjusted income, they found that the difference in environmental pollution between cities 
negatively affects inequality. Clarke-Sather et al. (2011) investigated inequalities in carbon dioxide 
(CO2) emissions in China at provincial level and compared its pattern with that of income. They 
found that inter-provincial CO2 emissions inequality is primarily intra-regional (Eastern, Western, 
and Central regions), while inter-provincial income inequality is inter-regional. 
Accessibility to medical care services has caused confusion during the transition period 
from a planned economy to a market economy. According to Liu et al. (1999), the number of 
workers in medical and health care sectors decreased by 35.9% from 1980 to 1989. In addition, Liu 
et al. (1999) and Bloom (2001) argued that medical professionals tend to be concentrated in urban 
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areas.7 Figure 3 shows the relationship between the number of doctors per thousand population and 
per capita GDP in the prefecture-level cities and direct-controlled municipalities. From Figure 3, we 
can confirm that the number of doctors tends to increase as per capita GDP increases. This suggests 
that the income inequality accelerates the concentration of medical care resources and negatively 
affects social welfare. 
 
Figure 3  Per capita GDP and the number of doctors in Chinese cities (2010) 
Note: Observations are the same as in Figure 2. 
Sources: China City Statistical Yearbook 2011 and 2010 Population Census. 
  
There are several studies that focus on the relationship between medical care and income 
inequality. Zhang and Kambur (2005) analyzed the spatial inequality of medical care and education 
in China using the Gini index and an entropy measure. According to their analysis, at the provincial 
level, inequality measured by the number of beds and professionals has shrunk during the 50s and 
70s and was flat through the 80s. On the other hand, inequality between urban and rural areas based 
on the number of beds and doctors has continuously increased. Zhang and Kambur (2005) argued 
that the disparity in infant mortality rate between urban and rural has grown due to inequality of 
medical resources.8 They suggested that tight fiscal constraints caused by the decentralization lie in 
the background of this trend. 
Although the intensive studies described above reveal various aspects of regional income 
inequality, the environment, and medical care, some issues still need to be clarified. Firstly, further 
                                                        
7.   Also, Zhao (2006) argued, using data from the National Health Services Survey of 2003, that there are substantial 
disparities in accessibility medical care service between urban and rural areas, and between large and small 
cities. 
8.  Fang et al. (2010) pointed out that regional health inequality in China is associated with health resources. They 
also argued that primary health care rather than hospital services is important in reducing health inequality. 
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investigation should be done on the indices and procedures used to analyze regional inequality. 
Much literature on regional inequality utilizes the aggregate measures such as the Gini and Theil 
indices, which concentrate relative inequality. However, if we take into account the substantial 
increase in mean income in the Chinese economy, it is not sufficient to focus on only relative 
inequality. We should analyze regional inequality giving consideration to increased absolute levels 
of income. In addition, to obtain robust welfare implications from changes in the regional inequality, 
rather than aggregative indices, non-aggregative dominance criteria should be employed.9  
Secondly, there is room for expansion in the treatment of multidimensional attributes. In the 
related literature, the regional inequality of individual items such as income, health and education 
has been considered. However, no comprehensive investigation that contains multiple attributes has 
been implemented as far as we know.10 Brajer et al. (2010) is an informative analysis in the sense 
that the effects of environmental deterioration on health status are incorporated into regional income 
inequality. However, in their analysis, inequality is measured using Gini or Theil coefficients. In 
addition, although they revealed that income inequality grew from 1995 to 2004, they do not take 
into account any increase in mean income. 
Thirdly, the policy implications obtained from the analyses are limited. Since the bulk of 
studies have dealt with regional inequality using aggregative means, it is not necessarily clear which 
attributes, and at what level, should be devoted to improving the social welfare. The existing studies 
on regional inequality have focused on the sources of inequality such as inter- intra-provincial or 
urban-rural factors. Such studies make substantial contributions by clarifying the sources of income 
inequality. However, in order to identify the future direction of public policy, analyses that enable us 
to the problems in more detail will be needed. 
To address the remaining issues described above, we will employ a novel analytical 
procedure to evaluate regional inequality. First, employing data for 2006 to 2010 for prefecture-level 
cities and direct-controlled municipalities, we utilize a concept that extends GL to multidimensional 
attributes, in our case, income, the environment, and medical care. By using city-based data, we can 
capture regional inequality in more detail than with provincial data. Indeed, intra-provincial 
inequality is an important factor in investigating recent trends in Chinese regional inequality. For 
example Akita (2003) argued that intra-provincial income inequality has a significant effect on total 
regional inequality by decomposing the Theil index. 
In addition, by extending GL to multidimensional attributes, we can comprehensively 
consider regional inequality, which is construed to contain income, environment, and medical care. 
                                                        
9.  While the focus is slightly different from our analysis, Bishop et al. (1996) considers income inequality within a 
region using a micro data set according to the Lorenz dominance criterion. Although Gustafsson et al. (2008) 
provided the Lorenz function for the whole of China and for cities and rural areas based on CHIP, they analyzed 
only the years 1988, 1995, and 2002. 
10. For countries other than China, several studies analyze social well-being using multidimensional dominance 
criteria. For example, Nilsson (2010) considered the inequality among Zambian households using the sequential 
generalized Lorenz dominance criterion. Muller and Trannoy (2011) proposed a multidimensional dominance 
criterion having attributes consisting of income, health and education, and investigated the change in welfare 
distribution among countries between 2000 and 2004. 
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The dominance criterion employed in this paper, which can be interpreted as an extension of 
uniform majorization (UM) as proposed by Kolm (1977), can produce welfare ordering for a broad 
class of social welfare functions similar to UM. 11  Moreover, we can frame the procedure for 
checking the criterion as a linear programming problem.12 With such a formulation, we can clarify 
which directions will improve social welfare if the distribution of attributes cannot be seen as 
desirable compared with the distribution of the base year. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we provide an analytical 
framework. In Section 3, we construct the data set and provide preliminary results. In Section 4, we 
show the results and provide an interpretation. In Section 5, we conclude the analysis. 
2 Analytical Framework 
In this section, we provide a framework for the analysis. Consider an economy consisting of ݎ ൒ 2 
regions and ௃݊ ൒ 2 individuals for period ܬ, where ܬ ∈ ሼܺ, ܻሽ. Hereafter, X and Y are referred to as 
the given year and the base year, respectively. We define a set of indexed individuals as ௃ܰ ൌ
ሼ1, … , ௃݊ሽ  and define a set of indexed regions as ܴ ൌ ሼ1,… , ݎሽ . Let ௜ܰሺ௃ሻ  be an indexed set of 
individuals who lives in region ݅ ∈ ܴ for period ܬ ∈ ሼܺ, ܻሽ. That is, ⋃௜∈ோ ௜ܰሺ௃ሻ ൌ ௃ܰ.	 Thus,	ห ௜ܰሺ௃ሻห	 
represents the population in region i in period ܬ, which is denoted by ݊௜ሺ௃ሻ and ௃݊ ൌ ∑ ݊௜ሺ௃ሻ௥௜ୀଵ . The 
distribution of the population over the region is represented by a vector, 
ܖ௃ ൌ ൫݊ଵሺ௃ሻ, … , ݊௥ሺ௃ሻ൯, 
for ܬ ∈ ሼܺ, ܻሽ. 
Each individual's well-being depends on m attributes. The attributes of individual j in 
periods X and Y are respectively denoted by 
ܠ௝ ൌ ൥
ݔଵ௝
⋮
ݔ௠௝
൩ , 	ܡ௝ ൌ ൥
ݕଵ௝
⋮
ݕ௠௝
൩. 
Since our concern is on regional inequality, we assume that all individuals living in the same region 
have the same attributes. Let ܠ௜ and ܡ௜  for ݅ ∈ ܴ be the vectors that represent the attributes of an 
individual living in region i in the given year and the base year, respectively. Thus, the distributions 
of attributes in the given year and the base year are respectively represented as follows: 
܆෩ ൌ ሾܠଵ, … , ܠଵᇣᇧᇤᇧᇥ
௡భሺ೉ሻ
, … , ܠ௥, … , ܠ௥ᇣᇧᇤᇧᇥ
௡ೝሺ೉ሻ
ሿ, 
                                                        
11. See Marshall et al. (2011) for a detailed discussion of the theory of majorization. 
12. Recently, using data envelopment analysis (DEA), some researchers have focused on the efficiency of Chinese 
economic activity taking undesirable outputs such as air pollution into account (e.g. Liu and Lo, 2007; Song et al., 
2012). Our study differs from the DEA-based analyses in the sense that our main concern is welfare ordering, 
although both employ linear programming techniques. 
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܇෩ ൌ ሾܡଵ, … , ܡଵᇣᇧᇤᇧᇥ
௡భሺೊሻ
, … , ܡ௥, … , ܡ௥ᇣᇧᇤᇧᇥ
௡ೝሺೊሻ
ሿ. 
In the given year, the well-being of an individual who lives in region i is represented by the 
following utility index. 
 ݑ௜ሺ௑ሻ ൌ ݑሺܠ௜ሻ, (1) 
for ݅ ∈ ܴ. Similarly, the well-being of an individual for the base year is represented by ݑ௜ሺ௒ሻ ൌ ݑሺܡ௜ሻ. 
The utility index is not necessarily the same as the utility function that represents an individual's 
preferences. Rather, the utility index can be interpreted as a function that the policy maker or the 
researcher employs to evaluate the well-being of an individual. The utility index is assumed to be 
cardinal. In addition, the same functional form is applied to every individual. Furthermore, we make 
the following assumption on the utility index. 
Assumption 1 The utility index is continuous, non-decreasing and concave in the attributes. 
In what follows, we denote the class of utility indices that satisfy Assumption 1 as Ω௨. 
Social welfare is evaluated using a social evaluation function which is a function of an 
individual's well-being. That is, 
 ܵ ௃ܹ ൌ ଵ௡಻ ∑ ݊௜ሺ௃ሻݑ௜ሺ௃ሻ
௥௜ୀଵ , (2) 
for ܬ ∈ ሼܺ, ܻሽ. Equation (2) implies that the society’s well-being can be represented as a weighted 
sum of its individuals’ well-being. 
Later, we compare the distributions of attributes in a given year with the base year. 
However, since the sizes of matrices ܆෩ and ܇෩ are extremely large, it is difficult to compare ܆෩ with ܇෩ 
directly. Therefore, we replace ܆෩ and ܇෩ with ܆෡ and ܇෡ defined as follows: 
܆෡ ൌ ሾܠଵ, … , ܠ௥ሿ, 
܇෡ ൌ ሾܡଵ, … , ܡ௥ሿ. 
Furthermore, in order to compare social welfare based on ܆෡ and ܇෡, we define the following 
matrix, which can be interpreted as a compressed form of a doubly stochastic matrix. 
Definition 1 (Compressed doubly stochastic matrix) An r-by-r nonnegative matrix ۿ෡ is said to be a 
compressed doubly stochastic matrix if the following properties are satisfied, 
(1) ܍௥ۿ෡ ൌ ଵ௡೉ ܖ௑, 
(2) ۿ෡܍௥் ൌ ଵ௡ೊ ܖ௒். 
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where ܍௥ denotes an r-dimensional row vector whose entries are one. 
 
That is, ۿ෡  is a nonnegative square matrix whose column sum is equal to the population 
share in the given year and whose row sum is equal to the population share in the base year. We 
denote the set of compressed doubly stochastic matrices determined by the distributions of 
population, ܖ௑ and ܖ௒, as Ψሺܖ௑, ܖ௒ሻ.13 
By using the notation mentioned above, we can define a dominance criterion, which we 
then use herein. 
Definition 2 (Uniform supermajorization). Let ܆෡ and ܇෡ be m-by-r matrices and ܁ be an r-by-r 
diagonal matrix defined as ܁ ≡ diag ቀ௡భሺ೉ሻ௡೉ , … ,
௡ೝሺ೉ሻ
௡೉ ቁ.
14 ܆෡ is said to be uniformly supermajorized by 
܇෡ (in symbols ܆෡ ≺௪ ܇෡), if 
 ܇෡ۿ෡ ൑ ܆෡∗, (3) 
holds for some ۿ෡ ∈ Ψሺܖ௑, ܖ௒ሻ, where ܆෡∗ ≡ ܆෡܁. 
 
Uniform supermajorization (USM) can be interpreted as an extension of UM as proposed by 
Kolm (1977) in the economics literature.15 In the theory of stochastic dominance, USM is known as 
increasing-concave (second-order) stochastic ordering (ICV).16 By considering ICV based on an 
empirical distribution, we can easily relate ICV with other multivariate majorization criteria.  
USM’s welfare implications are similar to those of UM. 
Proposition 1 Let ܆෡ and ܇෡ be m-by-r matrices. The following two conditions are equivalent. 
(1) ܆෡ ≺௪ ܇෡. 
(2) ܵ ௑ܹ ൒ ܵ ௒ܹ holds for all ݑ ∈ Ω௨. 
Proof  See Appendix. 
 
                                                        
13. For ܫ, ܬ ∈ ሼܺ, ܻሽ and ܫ ് 	ܬ, let ۱௃ be an r-by- ෤݊ሺ≡ ݊௑݊௒ሻ block matrix defined as  
۱௃ ≡ 1݊௃ ቎
܍௡಺௡భሺ௃ሻ ۽
⋱
۽ ܍௡಺௡ೝሺ௃ሻ
቏. 
For a given ෤݊-dimensional doubly stochastic matrix, ۿ, a compressed doubly stochastic matrix ۿ෡ ∈ Ψሺܖ௑, ܖ௒ሻ is 
obtained as ۿ෡ ൌ ۱௒ۿ۱௑். 
14.  Hereafter, diagሺݖଵ, … , ݖ௥ሻ is an r-dimensional diagonal matrix whose diagonal elements are ݖଵ, … , ݖ௥. 
15. Since the present analysis focuses on data aggregated by region, the definition of UM is slightly modified from 
that in Kolm (1977). In Kolm (1977), for given r-by-n matrices, X and Y, X is said to be uniformly 
supermajorized by Y, if ܇ۿ ൌ ܆ holds for some doubly stochastic matrix ۿ. Within the context of the present 
analysis, ܆෡ is said to be uniformly majorized by ܇෡ (in symbol ܆෡ ≺ ܇෡), if ܇෡ۿ෡ ൌ ܆෡∗ holds for some ۿ෡ ∈ Ψሺܖ௑, ܖ௒ሻ. 
16. For example, see Müller and Stoyan (2002). 
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Proposition 1 can be regarded as an extension of Shorrocks theorem to the multidimensional 
attributes. From Proposition 1, if ܆෡ ≺௪ ܇෡ holds then we can say that the social well-being in the 
given year is more desirable than that in the base year under the social evaluation function defined as 
equation (2) with all utility indices satisfying Assumption 1. In contrast, if ܆෡ ⊀௪ ܇෡ then there exists 
a utility index such that ܇෡ is more desirable than ܆෡. It should be noted that ܆෡ ⊀௪ ܇෡ does not always 
imply ܇෡ ≺௪ ܆෡. Since we cannot exclude the possibility that both ܆෡ ⊀௪ ܇෡ and ܇෡ ⊀௪ ܆෡ hold, there 
may be a case in which the two distributions are not rankable in the sense of social well-being.17 
If we consider a univariate case such as ݉=1, USM coincides with the familiar GL-
dominance criterion. In such a situation, USM can be easily checked using the GL curve. When we 
consider more than two attributes, we can check USM using a linear programming model instead of 
the GL curve. Vectorizing inequality (3), we obtain the following problem.  
 
Problem 1 (P1). Consider the following problem. 
minܙ ܉ܙ, 
subject to 
ۯܙ ൌ ܊, 
ܙ ൒ ૙, 
where 
܉ ≡ ሺ૙௥మା௠௥,ܟ௅ሻ, ܊ ≡
ۏێ
ێێ
ێۍ
vec܆෡∗1
݊௒ ܖ௒
ࢀ
1
݊௑ ܖ௑
ࢀ
ےۑ
ۑۑ
ۑې , ۯ ≡ ቎
۷௥⨂܇෡ ۷௠௥ െ۷௠௥܍௥⨂۷௥ ۽ ۽۷௥⨂܍௥ ۽ ۽
቏, 
۷௦  is a s-dimensional identity matrix, and ܟ௅  is an mr-dimensional row vector with positive 
constants. In addition, vec and ⨂  denote the column stacking operator and Kronecker product, 
respectively.18 
 
Since (P1) is a standard linear programming model, we can easily check USM by 
investigating the optimal solution of (P1). 
Proposition 2 Let ܆෡ and ܇෡ be m-by-r matrices. The following two conditions are equivalent. 
                                                        
17. In what follows, inequality is to be interpreted component-wise. 
18. For an m-by-n matrix ܈ ൌ ሾܢଵ, … , ܢ௡ሿ consisting of m-dimensional column vectors ܢ௝, vecZ is defined as 
vec܈ ≡ ൥
ܢଵ⋮
ܢ௡
൩. 
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(1) For a given ܟ௅ ൐ ૙, the optimal value for (P1) is zero, 
(2) ܵ ௑ܹ ൒ ܵ ௒ܹ holds for all ݑ ∈ Ω௨. 
Proof. That is clear from (P1). 
 
Whether the optimal solution of (P1) is zero or positive does not depend on ܟ௅. When the 
optimal solution of (P1) is not zero, its value depends on the coefficient vector. By solving (P1), we 
obtain a recommended policy for which attributes should be improved and in which region the utility 
should be improved. Let ܙ∗ be an optimal solution vector of (P1). We decompose ܙ∗ into column 
vectors such as 
ܙ∗ ൌ ቎
ܙ஽ௌ∗
ܙ௉∗
ܙே∗
቏. 
where ܙ஽ௌ∗  is an r2-dimensional column vector, and ܙ௉∗ 	and ܙே∗  are mr-dimensional column vectors. 
From the equality constraint of (P1), we obtain ൫۷௥⨂܇෡൯ܙ஽ௌ∗ ൅ ܙ௉∗ െ ܙே∗ ൌ vec܆෡∗	which can be 
rewritten in matrix form as follows: 
 ܇෡ۿ෡∗ ൅ ۿ෩௉∗ െ ۿ෩ே∗ ൌ ܆෡∗, (4) 
where ۿ෡∗ ∈ Ψሺܖ௑, ܖ௒ሻ  such that vecۿ෡∗ ൌ ܙ஽ௌ∗  holds. Similarly, ۿ෩௉∗  and ۿ෩ே∗  are m-by-r matrices 
such that vecۿ෩௉∗ ൌ ܙ௉∗ 	 and vecۿ෩ே∗ ൌ ܙே∗  hold, respectively. Considering equation (4), we obtain an 
m-by-r matrix defined as  
 Δ܆෡ ൌ ۿ෩ே∗ ܁ିଵ, (5) 
which satisfies ܆෡ ൅ Δ܆෡ ≺௪ ܇෡ . 19  That is, Δܠ௜  in Δ܆෡ ≡ ሾΔܠଵ, … , Δܠ௥ሿ  represents the incremental 
changes in the attributes in region i that must be improved to increase social well-being. Thus, the 
objective function of (P1) can be represented as follows: 
 ܧ൫ܟ, ܆෡, ܇෡൯ ൌ min୴ୣୡ୼܆෡൛ܟ ∙ vecΔ܆෡:	܆෡ ൅ Δ܆෡ ≺௪ ܇෡, Δ܆෡ ൒ ۽ൟ. (6) 
In the above definition, ܟ is a shadow price vector of attributes. The coefficient vector of (P1), ܟ௅, 
is related to ܟ as follows: 
 ܟ௅ ൌ ܟሺ܁ିଵ⨂۷௠ሻ. (7) 
Decomposing ܟ into m-dimensional row vectors ܟ ≡ ሺܟଵ,… ,ܟ௥ሻ, we obtain the shadow prices of 
attributes applied to region i in the form of ܟ௝ ൌ ሺݓଵ௝, … , ݓ௠௝ሻ. 
                                                        
19. Vectorizing Δ܆෡, we can rewrite (5) as vecΔ܆෡ ൌ ሺ܁ିଵ⨂۷௥ሻܙே∗ . 
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Example Consider a society consisting of four regions and three attributes. Suppose that the 
distributions of residents in the base and given years are ܖ௒ ൌ ሺ10, 20, 30, 40ሻ  and ܖ௑ ൌ
ሺ5, 20, 45, 55ሻ, respectively. In addition, the distributions of attributes in the base year and the given 
year are assumed to be 
܇෡ ൌ ൥
200 300 400 500
50 100 300 20
300 200 100 400
൩,					܆෡ ൌ ൥
250 300 400 450
30 120 260 40
300 200 160 370
൩. 
Since ܁ ൌ diag ቀ ହଵଶହ
ଶ଴
ଵଶହ
ସହ
ଵଶହ
ହହ
ଵଶହቁ, we have  
܆෡∗ ≡ ܆෡܁ ൌ ൥
10 48 144 198
1.2 19.2 93.6 17.6
12 32 57.6 162.8
൩. 
The shadow price vector for region j(=1,…,4) is set as ܟ௝ ൌ ሺ100 100 100ሻ. Hence, according 
to equation (7), ܟ௅ ൌ ቀଵଶହହ ܟଵ
ଵଶହ
ଶ଴ ܟଶ
ଵଶହ
ସହ ܟଷ
ଵଶହ
ହହ ܟସቁ . Solving (P1), we obtain the optimal 
value as minܙ ܉ܙ ൌ 2250 which implies ܆෡ ⊀௪ ܇෡. From the solution vector of (P1), we can construct 
a matrix,  
ۿ෩ே∗ ൌ ൥
0 0 0 0
0.9 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
൩. 
That is, if the second attribute in region 1 is increased by 22.5=0.9/0.04, then USM is achieved. 
Indeed, when we consider a distribution of attributes such as 
܆෡∗ᇱ ≡ ܆෡∗ ൅ ۿ෩ே∗ ൌ ൥
10 48 144 198
2.1 19.2 93.6 17.6
12 32 57.6 162.8
൩, 
we have a compressed doubly stochastic matrix such that ܇෡ۿ෡ ൑ ܆෡∗ᇱ holds as follows:  
ۿ ൌ ൦
. 030 . 000 . 004 . 066
. 005 . 160 . 035 . 000
. 000 . 000 . 278 . 022
. 005 . 000 . 043 . 352
൪. 
Thus, from Definition 1, we obtain ܆෡ᇱ ≺௪ ܇෡,	 where ܆෡ᇱ ≡ ܆෡∗ᇱ܁ିଵ. 
 
In the subsequent sections, we consider the change in social well-being in China by solving 
(P1) based on statistics from Chinese cities. 
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3 Data and Preliminary Results 
In this section, we construct a data set for the analysis and provide preliminary results. The time 
period for the analysis is from 2006 to 2010. This period coincides exactly with the 11th five-year 
plan. We analyze China's regional inequality based on statistics aggregated for prefecture-level cities 
and direct-controlled municipalities. In 2010, there were four direct-controlled municipalities: 
Beijing, Tianjin, Shanghai and Chongqing. The direct-controlled municipalities have authority 
similar to that of the provinces. On the other hand, the prefecture-level cities belong to the provinces. 
In 2010, there were 283 prefecture-level cities, which did not change during the time period of the 
analysis. 
The prefecture-level cities differ from typical cities since most of them contain rural areas. 
Hence, secondary or tertiary industries are not necessarily the main activities there. Figure 4 depicts 
the industrial structure in each city measured by the GDP shares of primary, secondary, and tertiary 
industries. As seen in Figure 4, in some cities, the GDP share of primary industries is higher than 
30%.  
 
 
Figure 4  Cities’ industrial structure (2010) 
Source: China City Statistical Yearbook 2011. 
Notes: (x, y, z) denotes the GDP share of the primary, secondary, and tertiary industries, respectively. Observations 
are the same as in Figure 2. 
 
Since the prefecture-level cities and the direct-controlled municipalities are not identical 
with respect to their sizes, authorities etc., treating them in the same category may be controversial. 
However, exclusion of the direct-controlled municipalities from the data set would ignore major 
trends in inequality arising from disparities between metropolitan and rural areas. On the other hand, 
analysis based on data consisting of provinces, autonomous areas and the direct-controlled 
municipalities cannot capture intra-provincial disparities. Therefore, we investigated regional 
inequality based on data for prefecture-level cities and the direct-controlled municipalities.  
(100, 0, 0)
(0 , 0, 100) (0,100,0)
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When using Chinese cities as the unit for analysis, demographic statistics should be treated 
carefully. Demographic statistics of Chinese cities are sometimes based on residents registered by 
public security office (hukou). For analytical purposes, the actual number of residents, not the hukou 
population, is appropriate. Indeed, there are huge differences between the hukou and resident 
populations.20 But reliable statistics on actual population of each city do not exist except for the 
years 2000, 2005 and 2010 when censuses or population sample surveys were conducted. In the 
present analysis, we use the estimated population based on the 2000 Population Census, 2005 1% 
Population Sample Survey, and 2010 Population Census.21 
 
Table 2 Summary statistics for cities 
 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Population (ten thousand )a) 
Mean 418  422  426  430  434  
Std. Dev. 295 301 307 315 323 
Min 19  20  21  22  23  
Max 2815  2832  2850  2867  2885  
Total 119638  120667  121742  122865  124037  
Land area (km2)b) 
Mean 16398  16435  16448  16475  16484  
Std. Dev. 21830 21833 21840 21962 21960 
Min 1113  1113  1113  1113  1113  
Max 253356  253356  253356  253356  253356  
Number of citiesc) 
 286 286 286 286 286 
Notes. a) Estimation by author based on 2000 Population Census, 2005 1% Population Sample Survey 
and 2010 Population Census. b) Based on China City Statistical Yearbook. c) Sum of direct-controlled 
municipalities and prefecture-level cities except for Lhasa in Tibet.  
 
Table 2 presents summary statistics for the population and land area of the cities included in 
the analysis. Generally, prefecture-level cities have sub-divisions such as county-level cities, 
counties, and districts. But all county-level cities do not necessarily belong to prefecture-level cities. 
That is, the data set we construct does not contain the entire area of China. In addition, Lhasa in the 
Tibet autonomous area is excluded from the analysis due to the lack of data. As a result, through the 
period for which we investigate, we include 286 cities: 282 prefecture-level cities and 4 direct-
                                                        
20. In Beijing, for example, the population reported in the China City Statistical Yearbook, which is based on hukou, 
is 12578 (in thousand persons), while its resident population based on the 2010 Population Census is 19612. See 
Chan (2006, 2007) for a detailed discussion of the demographic statistics of Chinese cities. 
21. The resident population of city i in year t is simply estimated as ݊௜ሺ௧ሻ ൌ ሺ1 ൅ ߚ௜ሻ௧ି௧బ݊௜ሺ௧బሻ,where ݊௜ሺ௧బሻ is the 
resident population obtained from the 2000 Population Census, 2005 1% Population Sample Survey, or the 2006 
Statistical Communiqué on National Economic and Social Development for each city. We basically employ the 
data based on the 2005 1% Population Sample Survey as ݊௜ሺ௧బሻ. However, this data is not available in some cities. 
In such cases, the 2006 Statistical Communiqué on National Economic and Social Development of each city is 
used for the analysis. Furthermore, if neither 2005 nor 2006 resident population is available, data from the 2000 
population census is employed. The average growth rate of population of city i, is calculated as 1 ൅ ߚ௜ ൌ
ሺ݊௜ሺ்ሻ/݊௜ሺ௧బሻሻଵ/ሺ்ି௧బሻ, where ݊௜ሺ்ሻ is the resident population of city i in the 2010 Population Census.    
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controlled municipalities. Since the total population in 2010 is 1.34 billion, more than 90% of the 
population is included in the analysis.  
We compiled the attribute data from the China City Statistical Yearbook edited by the 
National Bureau of Statistics of China. However, in the China City Statistical Yearbook, data for 
specific years in some cities is lacking. In addition, some values provided in the China City 
Statistical Yearbook seem to be inaccurate. We supplemented the missing data and corrected the 
inaccurate data using other statistics and governmental official reports. 
Five variables are adopted as proxy variables for the attributes that affect the well-being of 
individuals. As a proxy variable for individual income, we employ per capita GDP in each city, 
deflated by the GDP deflator of 2005=100. Using GDP as a proxy for individual income may be 
controversial since GDP is a territorial, rather than a personal concept for economic activity. 
For environmental quality, we focus on air pollution. In particular, we employ industrial 
SO2 and soot emissions as proxy variables for environmental quality. In the 11th five-year plan, 
reduction of total SO2 emissions was set as a binding target. Recently, soot emission from energy 
consumption has become suspected to cause serious health damage. In the analysis, both emissions 
are measured by their intensity in the geographical area of each city: emission intensity is defined as 
the amount of emissions (t)/land area (km2). Since increases in SO2 and soot emissions cause the 
environment to deteriorate, we capture the environmental quality as E - emission intensity, where E 
denotes the environmental capacity per land area. The results do not change if we do not include E in 
the calculation as long as it is constant across the various regions. Since environmental quality has 
the property of equitable consumption, we do not transform it into per a capita level. 
The distribution of medical resources is measured by the number of doctors and hospital 
beds in each city. The number of doctors per ten thousand population can be interpreted as an 
indicator of human resources for medical care. We include professional doctor and assistant doctors 
in the analysis. The number of hospital beds per ten thousand population reflects the physical level 
of medical resources. We concentrate our attention on the supply side of medical care services 
although the demand side, such as establishing a medical care system, is an important issue. 
Regional inequality in medical care due to demand will induce concentration of medical resources in 
particular region. Therefore, by investigating the inequality of medical resources distribution, we can 
also take into account part of the demand-side problem. 
In summary, the variables for city j in the given year are defined as follows: 
ܠ௝ ൌ
ۏ
ێێ
ێ
ۍݔଵ௝ݔଶ௝ݔଷ௝ݔସ௝ݔହ௝ے
ۑۑ
ۑ
ې
ൌ
ۏ
ێ
ێ
ێ
ۍ ܩܦܲ	݌݁ݎ	ܿܽ݌݅ݐܽ	݅݊	ܿ݅ݐݕ	݆െܫ݊݀ݑݏݐݎ݈݅ܽ	ܱܵଶ	݁݉݅ݏݏ݅݋݊	݅݊ݐ݁݊ݏ݅ݐݕ	݅݊	ܿ݅ݐݕ	݆
െܫ݊݀ݑݏݐݎ݈݅ܽ	ݏ݋݋ݐ	݁݉݅ݏݏ݅݋݊	݅݊ݐ݁݊ݏ݅ݐݕ	݅݊	ܿ݅ݐݕ	݆
ܰݑܾ݉݁ݎ	݋݂	݀݋ܿݐ݋ݎݏ	݌݁ݎ	ݐ݁݊	ݐ݄݋ݑݏܽ݊݀	݌݋݌ݑ݈ܽݐ݅݋݊	݅݊	ܿ݅ݐݕ	݆
ܰݑܾ݉݁ݎ	݋݂	݄݋ݏ݌݅ݐ݈ܽ	ܾ݁݀ݏ	݌݁ݎ	ݐ݁݊	ݐ݄݋ݑݏܽ݊݀	݌݋݌ݑ݈ܽݐ݅݋݊	݅݊	ܿ݅ݐݕ	݆ے
ۑ
ۑ
ۑ
ې
 
For the base year, the variables for city j, ܡ௝, are represented similarly. 
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Table 3 presents the summary statistics for the five attributes mentioned above. From Table 
3 it is clear that the mean value of each attribute moves toward improving social well-being: the 
mean GDP, the numbers of doctors and hospital beds increase, while the mean values of SO2 and 
soot emissions decline during the period. Since the utility index is assumed to be concave, it is 
undesirable that the minimum utility-index, hence minimum values of GDP and of medical 
resources, and maximum values of emissions, deteriorates. While the minimum number of hospital 
beds continuously increased, the minimum number of doctors declined from 2008 to 2009. Similarly, 
the maximum value of SO2 emissions increased from 2009 to 2010. Furthermore, soot emissions 
show unsteady changes. 
 
Table 3 Summary statistics of attributes 
  2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
GDP per capita (ten thousand 2005 CNY) 
Mean 1.72 1.89 2.09 2.29 2.56  
Std. Dev. 1.44 1.47 1.59 1.54 1.71  
Min 0.27 0.32 0.31 0.40 0.45  
Max 15.62 14.68 16.25 11.04 14.26  
Industrial SO2 emission intensity (t/km2)  
Mean 8.59 8.42 7.74 7.19 7.11  
Std. Dev. 10.61 10.03 8.82 7.72 7.64  
Min 0.06 0.06 0.05 0.04 0.01  
 Max 67.96 62.96 56.16 56.10 57.01  
Industrial soot emission intensity (t/km2) 
Mean 2.87 2.53 2.34 2.10 2.04  
Std. Dev. 3.05 2.81 2.70 2.37 2.35  
Min 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.02  
Max 15.81 15.11 16.88 16.08 14.85  
Number of doctors (per ten thousand population) 
Mean 15.39 16.43 16.97 17.47 18.28  
Std. Dev. 6.37 6.48 6.32 6.54 7.01  
Min 3.78 4.26 5.85 4.80 6.93  
Max 59.09 50.73 47.07 49.59 64.26  
Number of hospital beds (per ten thousand population)  
Mean 27.24 28.32 29.97 32.42 34.08  
Std. Dev. 10.62 9.89 9.79 10.23 9.47  
Min 10.36 10.81 11.07 11.77 12.36  
Max 84.25 73.42 73.62 104.27 77.82  
GDP deflator (2005=100) 
103.81 111.74 120.41 119.68 127.54  
Note: Weighted by population 
 
As discussed in the previous section, when USM does not hold, the optimal value of (P1) 
depends on the shadow prices of the attributes. In the present analysis, the shadow prices applied to 
region j, ܟ௝ ൌ ሺݓଵ௝, … , ݓହ௝ሻ, are set as follows: 
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 ݓଵ௝ ൌ ௡ೕሺ೉ሻ௡೉ ൈ 10
ସ ൈ ݌ଵ : GDP (8a) 
 ݓଶ௝ ൌ ௟ೕሺ೉ሻ௡೉ ൈ ݌ଶ : SO2 emissions (8b) 
 ݓଷ௝ ൌ ௟ೕሺ೉ሻ௡೉ ൈ ݌ଷ : Soot emissions (8c) 
 ݓସ௝ ൌ ௡ೕሺ೉ሻ௡೉ ൈ ݌ସ : Doctors (8d) 
 ݓହ௝ ൌ ௡ೕሺ೉ሻ௡೉ ൈ ݌ହ : Hospital beds (8e) 
where ௝݈ሺ௑ሻ denotes the land area of city j in the given year.22 In the above expressions, pi denotes a 
positive coefficient. For example, p2 can be interpreted as the cost of reducing one ton of SO2 
emissions. As a benchmark case, we set p1=100, p2=4, p3=1, p4=135 and p5=195 based on estimated 
costs for treating the pollution emissions (p2 and p3) and on government expenditures for the medical 
care (p4 and p5). 
Prior to the USM investigation, we investigate trends in regional disparities with an item-
by-item approach, where the GL dominance criterion is applied to each attribute. Table 4 presents 
the results.  
 
Table 4 Item-by-item dominance relation 
  Given year: X 
  2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Base year: Y 
2006 - I, E1, E2, M1, M2 I, E1, M1, M2 I, E1, M1, M2 I, E1, E2, M1, M2
2007 None - E1, M1, M2 I, E1, M1, M2 I, E1, E2, M1, M2
2008 None None - I, E2, M2 I, E1, M1, M2 
2009 None None None - I, M1, M2 
2010 None None None None - 
Notes: I=Per capita GDP, E1=SO2 emission, E2=Soot emission, M1=Number of doctors, M2=Number of hospital beds. 
In each cell, J(=I, E1, E2, M1, M2) implies that variable J in the base year is GL-dominated by that in the given year. 
 
From Table 4, we see the following: First, for per capita GDP, except for the pair {2007, 
2008}, the distribution of the later year dominates the distribution of the previous year in terms of 
GL.23 Second, in medical resources, the later year's distribution dominates the previous year's one 
except for the number of doctors in {2008, 2009}. Generally speaking, regional inequality in 
medical resources improved from 2006 to 2010 assuming that this is appropriately measured by the 
numbers of doctors and hospital beds. Finally, environmental quality shows somewhat unsteady 
changes. Except for the pairs {2006, 2007}, {2006, 2010}, and {2007, 2010}, at least one of two 
emissions is not rankable according to the GL dominance criterion. In this sense, we can predict that 
                                                        
22. In equation (8a), 104 is multiplied because the population is measured in 10000 persons.  
23. In what follows, {t1, t2} implies the comparison of {base year, given year}.  
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the distribution of environmental variables significantly affects welfare ordering during the time 
period of the analysis. 
A necessary condition for USM is that each attribute can be related to GL dominance.24 
From the results described above, this condition is satisfied for the pairs {2006, 2007}, {2006, 2010}, 
and {2007, 2010}. For these pairs, we can say that social well-being in the given year is better than 
the base year if we specify the utility index as additive separable, ݑ௜ሺ௑ሻ ൌ ݒଵሺݔଵ௜ሻ൅,… ,൅ݒ௠ሺݔ௠௜ሻ. 
However, for the general form of utility indices, this may not be necessarily true. In the next section, 
we consider social well-being in the recent Chinese economy based on this data set. 
4 Results and Implications 
First, solving (P1) for the distribution pairs in the data from 2006 to 2010, we check the 
USM criterion. As mentioned in the previous section, the pairs {2006, 2007}, {2006, 2010}, and 
{2007, 2010} are candidates for USM. However, the optimal solution of (P1) will provide 
information useful for understanding the situation. So, we solve (P1) for all distribution pairs. As 
shown in Proposition 2, a given year's distribution of attributes is uniformly supermajorized by the 
base year's distribution if the optimal value of (P1) is zero. In this case, social well-being, as 
characterized by equation (5), has improved from the base year to the given year. 
The results are shown in Table 5. We can obtain the following information from Table 5. 
Firstly, the distribution of 2010 dominates that of 2006 in USM. That is, social well-being in 2010 is 
better than 2006. However, the optimal solutions of (P1) other than {2006, 2010} are positive: these 
pairs are not rankable by USM. In the item-by-item approach, three pairs of distributions showed GL 
dominance for all attributes. Nevertheless, the fact that two of them are not robust for USM stresses 
the importance of simultaneous consideration of multidimensional attributes. 
 
Table 5 Optimal value of (P1) 
    Given year: X   
  2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
 2006 - 2.061E+00 3.260E-01 5.078E-02 5.669E-15 
 2007 1.845E+05 - 3.478E+00 1.078E-01 1.665E-02 
Base year: Y 2008 3.818E+05 1.976E+05 - 1.838E+00 2.723E-01 
 2009 6.323E+05 4.479E+05 2.509E+05 - 1.385E+00 
 2010 8.986E+05 7.141E+05 5.170E+05 2.670E+05 - 
Notes: Calculations implemented using 'linprog' function of MATLAB. Coefficient vector is set according 
to (7), (8), p1=100, p2=4, p3=1, p4=135, and p5=195. 
 
Secondly, when the given year is after the base year, the optimal value of (P1) becomes 
smaller as the given year becomes later compared with the base year. The optimal value represents 
the increments of attributes needed to achieve USM when we regard ܟ௅ as a shadow price vector of 
attributes. Applying this interpretation to the results, we can say that, although not actually improved, 
                                                        
24. This property is sometimes referred to as row-wise majorization. See Marshall et al.(2011).  
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the distribution of attributes has been gradually changing in the direction of social well-being 
improvement. 
Now, we investigate which attribute(s) may be bottlenecks that hamper improved welfare. 
According to the item-by-item analysis in the previous section, we can predict that the distribution of 
environmental quality hinders achieving welfare improvement. In order to clarify this prediction, we 
solve (P1) without SO2 and soot intensities. The results are summarized in Table 6. 
 
Table 6 Optimal value of (P1) without SO2 and soot emissions 
    Given year: X   
  2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
 2006  5.803E-01 2.677E-11 3.050E-02 1.707E-14 
 2007 1.845E+05  3.087E+00 2.738E-15 3.666E-16 
Base year: Y 2008 3.818E+05 1.975E+05  6.998E-01 4.679E-15 
 2009 6.323E+05 4.479E+05 2.509E+05  1.969E-14 
 2010 8.985E+05 7.141E+05 5.170E+05 2.670E+05  
Notes: Calculations are implemented using the 'linprog' function of MATLAB. Coefficient vector is set 
according to equations (7) and (8), p1=100, p2=4, p3=1, p4=135, and p5=195. 
 
Table 6 shows that the distribution in 2010 consisting of GDP and medical resources is 
superior based on USM to any base year. Therefore, considering Table 5 and Table 6 together, we 
can conclude that in 2010, the distribution of environmental quality is the reason some pairs of 
distributions are non-rankable. 
Next, we focus on the most recent pair {2009, 2010}. How much of an attribute is required 
in what region to achieve USM? To answer this question, we consider the attribute increments 
according to equation (5) for the pair {2009, 2010}. For city j, we express the total amounts of the 
attributes to be increased as follows: 
∆ܩܦ ௝ܲ ൌ ௝݊ሺ௑ሻ∆ݔଵ௝ 
∆ሺܱܵଶ	݁݉݅ݏݏ݅݋݊ሻ௝ ൌ െ∆ݔଶ௝ 
∆ሺܵ݋݋ݐ	݁݉݅ݏݏ݅݋݊ሻ௝ ൌ െ∆ݔଷ௝ 
∆ሺܦ݋ܿݐ݋ݎݏሻ௝ ൌ ௝݊ሺ௑ሻ∆ݔସ௝ 
∆ሺܪ݋ݏ݌݅ݐ݈ܽ	ܾ݁݀ݏሻ௝ ൌ ௝݊ሺ௑ሻ∆ݔହ௝ 
Table 7 summarizes the results. From Table 7, we see that, as discussed above, 
environmental quality is the main factor that should be improved to achieve the dominance relation. 
Also, cities with low per capita GDP do not necessarily need attributes to be improved. Indeed, 
comparing the cities listed in Table 7 with those of Table 1, we recognize that Anshun in Guizhou 
province is the only city among the 20 lowest-GDP cities where attributes need to be improved. In 
contrast, four of the twelve cities listed in Table 7 are from the 20 cities with the highest GDP. In 
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this sense, only focusing on reducing the income disparity between the coastal and inland regions, 
which is emphasized in the literature, is insufficient to develop public policies that will improve 
social well-being.  
As discussed in the previous section, the optimal solution depends on the coefficient vector, 
hence the shadow price vector. Taking into account recent economic growth trends, a drastic 
reduction in pollution may be difficult for practical reasons. If the results summarized in Table 7 do 
not change under the different shadow prices, improving environmental quality is essential for the 
future improvement in China’s social well-being.  
Table 8 summarizes the attribute increments when the shadow prices of environmental 
quality are high: p2=400 and p3=100 instead of p2=4 and p3=1. Most of the cities listed in Table 7 
where emissions must be reduced to improve social welfare are also listed in Table 8. Moreover, in 
seven of the eleven cities listed in both Table 7 and Table 8, reducing the emissions is still needed 
under the relatively high shadow price for environmental quality. Therefore, reducing SO2 and soot 
emissions in these cities is indispensable in improving social welfare. In addition, we can see that the 
required increments of medical resources are larger than the benchmark case. In particular, some 
cities located in inland areas such as Henan, Sichuan and Guizhou provinces need to increase the 
amount of medical resources. 
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Table 7 Changes in attributes to improve social well-being {2009, 2010} 
City Province 
ΔAttributes 
GDP -SO2 -Soot Doctor Hospital bed 
104CNY % t % t % Person % % 
Wuhai Inner Mongolia 0 (0.00) 1977 (1.98) 92 (0.48) 15 (1.15) 0 (0.00)
Shanghai  0 (0.00) 12913 (5.83) 5450 (13.04) 0 (0.00) 0 (0.00)
Zhoushan Zhejiang 0 (0.00) 0 (0.00) 2921 (16.68) 0 (0.00) 0 (0.00)
Huainan Anhui 0 (0.00) 0 (0.00) 462 (1.20) 0 (0.00) 0 (0.00)
Puyang Henan 0 (0.00) 0 (0.00) 229 (1.07) 0 (0.00) 0 (0.00)
Luohe Henan 0 (0.00) 0 (0.00) 890 (9.24) 0 (0.00) 0 (0.00)
Shenzhen Guangdong 0 (0.00) 1755 (5.38) 0 (0.00) 0 (0.00) 0 (0.00)
Shantou Guangdong 0 (0.00) 0 (0.00) 728 (14.74) 0 (0.00) 0 (0.00)
Foshan Guangdong 0 (0.00) 0 (0.00) 4119 (12.33) 0 (0.00) 0 (0.00)
Dongguan Guangdong 0 (0.00) 9155 (9.16) 2146 (7.37) 0 (0.00) 0 (0.00)
Neijiang Sichuan 0 (0.00) 0 (0.00) 5829 (24.09) 0 (0.00) 0 (0.00)
Anshun Guizhou 0 (0.00) 1351 (0.91) 0 (0.00) 284 (16.69) 0 (0.00)
Total  0 (0.00) 27150 (0.16) 22866 (0.42) 298 (0.01) 0 (0.00)
Notes: p1=100, p2=4, p3=1, p4=135, p5=195. 
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Table8  Changes in attributes to improve social well-being {2009, 2010} (relatively high shadow price of environment) 
City Province 
ΔAttributes 
GDP -SO2 -Soot Doctor Hospital bed 
104CNY % t % t % Person % % 
Wuhai Inner Mongolia 0 (0.00) 1977 (1.98) 92 (0.48) 15 (1.15) 0 (0.00)
Qitaihe Heilongjiang 0 (0.00) 0 (0.00) 0 (0.00) 75 (6.42) 0 (0.00)
Shanghai  0 (0.00) 10416 (4.70) 4914 (11.76) 411 (0.96) 0 (0.00)
Zhoushan Zhejiang 0 (0.00) 0 (0.00) 2921 (16.68) 0 (0.00) 0 (0.00)
Huainan Anhui 0 (0.00) 0 (0.00) 462 (1.20) 0 (0.00) 0 (0.00)
Zibo Shandong 0 (0.00) 0 (0.00) 0 (0.00) 103 (1.31) 0 (0.00)
Zhengzhou Henan 0 (0.00) 0 (0.00) 0 (0.00) 3431 (22.90) 0 (0.00)
Kaifeng Henan 0 (0.00) 0 (0.00) 0 (0.00) 8 (0.13) 0 (0.00)
Luohe Henan 0 (0.00) 0 (0.00) 0 (0.00) 98 (3.55) 0 (0.00)
Shenzhen Guangdong 0 (0.00) 1755 (5.38) 0 (0.00) 0 (0.00) 0 (0.00)
Shantou Guangdong 0 (0.00) 0 (0.00) 0 (0.00) 311 (5.54) 1316 (11.53)
Foshan Guangdong 0 (0.00) 0 (0.00) 3137 (9.39) 199 (1.68) 0 (0.00)
Dongguan Guangdong 0 (0.00) 8964 (8.97) 1735 (5.96) 453 (3.43) 0 (0.00)
Neijiang Sichuan 0 (0.00) 0 (0.00) 0 (0.00) 531 (13.09) 0 (0.00)
Meishan Sichuan 0 (0.00) 0 (0.00) 0 (0.00) 122 (3.81) 0 (0.00)
Liupanshui Guizhou 0 (0.00) 0 (0.00) 0 (0.00) 226 (8.80) 0 (0.00)
Anshun Guizhou 0 (0.00) 0 (0.00) 0 (0.00) 308 (18.09) 160 (2.90)
Total  0 (0.00) 23111 (0.14) 13261 (0.25) 6296 (0.28) 1477 (0.04)
Notes: p1=100, p2=400, p3=100, p4=135, p5=195. 
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5 Concluding Remarks 
In this paper, we evaluate multidimensional regional inequality in China from 2006 to 2010 based on 
data consisting of prefecture-level cities and direct-controlled municipalities. Taking into account 
not only income but also the environment and medical resources, we consider welfare ordering 
during that time period. As shown in Figure 1 in the Introduction, regional (relative) inequality based 
on provincial data has tended to decline. In this sense, one may claim that rapid economic growth 
may contribute to improved social welfare. However, the analysis presented in Section 3 reveals that 
social well-being is not necessarily improved year by year when we consider other aspects of 
welfare than individual income. 
Based on these results, we find that the distribution of pollution emissions is a bottleneck 
that hinders improving social welfare. On the other hand, recent changes in the distributions of GDP 
and of medical resources work toward improving social well-being. That is, when we consider a 
utility index consisting of GDP and medical resources, the social well-being in 2010 is better than 
any previous year in the time period.  
When we compare 2009 and 2010, it should be noted that the GDPs of cities where 
polluting emissions need to be reduced to improve social welfare are not necessarily low. Improving 
the environmental quality in rich cities such as Shanghai and Shenzhen is an urgent problem to be 
solved not only for each individual city but also for overall social welfare.  
There are several points for future research. First, considering the other variables that affect 
well-being may reveal other rich implications. For example, environmental quality in each city is 
measured by SO2 emission. Some other environmental aspects like water contaminants may be 
important factors determining well-being. Within the medical care services, we concentrate on the 
supply side. Alternatively, the demand side of medical care, such as health status, should be 
considered in more comprehensive studies. 
Second, by expanding the period to be evaluated, we can obtain more insights on China's 
regional inequality. Although the present study of the five years between 2006 and 2010 is 
informative in that it reveals recent trends in inequality, studies of longer periods will be needed to 
evaluate development policies such as China’s Great Western Development and Northeast Area 
Revitalization. 
As a theoretical consideration, we do not implement any statistical tests to evaluate our 
welfare orderings. A method for statistical inference need to be developed for the procedure 
presented here. 
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Appendix 
Proof of Proposition 1 
First, we prove the following Lemma. 
Lemma A1. Let ܆ and ܇ be m-by- ෤݊ matrices consisting of m dimensional column vectors ܠ௜ and ܡ௜, 
respectively. The following two conditions are equivalent. 
(1) ܇ۿ ൑ ܆ holds for some doubly stochastic matrix ۿ. 
(2) ∑ ݑሺܠ௜ሻ௡෤௜ୀଵ ൒ ∑ ݑሺܡ௜ሻ௡෤௜ୀଵ  holds for all ݑ ∈ Ω௨.  
Proof. (1)	⇒ (2) follows from that u is non-decreasing concave function in attributes. Now, we 
consider 2)⇒1). Suppose that for all ෤݊-by- ෤݊ doubly stochastic matrices ۿ,  
 ܇ۿ ≰ ܆ (A.1) 
Vectrizing inequality (A.1), we can state that  
 ۯ෩ܘ෥ ൑ ܊ሚ  (A.2) 
does not have non-positive solution, ܘ෥, where 
ۯ෩ ≡
ۏ
ێێ
ێ
ۍ ۷௡෤⨂܇܍௡෤⨂۷௡෤െ܍௡෤⨂۷௡෤۷௡෤⨂܍௡෤െ۷௡෤⨂܍௡෤ے
ۑۑ
ۑ
ې
, and ܊ሚ ≡
ۏێ
ێێ
ێ
ۍvec܆܍௡෤்
െ܍௡෤்
܍௡෤்
െ܍௡෤் ے
ۑۑ
ۑۑ
ې
. 
From the theorem of alternative on non-negative solution in linear inequality (Gale 1960, Theorem 
2.8), we know that the system of inequalities 
 ܞۯ෩ ൒ ૙, (A.3) 
 ܞ܊ሚ ൏ 0, (A.4) 
have a non-negative solution, ܞ . Let ܞ∗ ൌ ሾܞଵ∗, … , ܞ௡෤∗, ුܢ∗, ࢠො∗, ̌܋∗, ̂܋∗ሿ  be a non-negative vector 
satisfying inequalities (A.3) and (A.4), where ܞ௜∗ ∈ Թା௠  for ݅ ൌ 1,… , ෤݊ , and ුܢ∗, ࢠො∗, ̌܋∗, ̂܋∗ ∈ Թା௡෤ . 
Inequality (A.3) implies that 
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ܞ௜∗ܡ௝ ൅ ݖ௝∗ ൅ ܿ௜∗ ൒ 0 
holds for ݅, ݆ ൌ 1,… , ෤݊ , where ݖ௝∗ ≡ ̌ݖ௝∗ െ ̂ݖ௝∗ and ܿ௜∗ ≡ ܿ̌௜∗ െ ܿ̂௜∗. Furthermore, from inequality (A.4), 
we obtain  
෍ሺܞ௜∗ܠ௜ ൅ ݖ௜∗ ൅ ܿ௜∗ሻ
௡෤
௜ୀଵ
൏ 0. 
Now, let define ܸ∗ ൌ ሼሾܿଵ∗, ܞଵ∗ሿ, … , ሾܿ௡෤∗ , ܞ௡෤∗ሿሽ as a set consisting of m+1 dimensional vector. 
We can confirm the following inequalities: 
 ∑ ሺܞ௜∗ܠ௜ ൅ ݖ௜∗ ൅ ܿ௜∗ሻ௡෤௜ୀଵ ൒ ∑ minሾ௖ೕ∗,ܞೕ∗ሿ∈௏∗ ൜ൣ ௝ܿ∗, ܞ௝∗൧ ൤
1
ܠ௜൨ൠ
௡෤௜ୀଵ ൅ ∑ ݖ௜∗௡෤௜ୀଵ , (A.5) 
 ∑ minሾ௖ೕ∗,ܞೕ∗ሿ∈௏∗ ൜ൣ ௝ܿ∗, ܞ௝∗൧ ൤
1
ܡ௜൨ൠ
௡෤௜ୀଵ ൅ ∑ ݖ௝∗௡෤௝ୀଵ ൒ 0. (A.6) 
Combining inequality (A.5) with inequality (A.6), we obtain 
 ∑ minሾ௖ೕ∗,ܞೕ∗ሿ∈௏∗ ൜ൣ ௝ܿ∗, ܞ௝∗൧ ൤
1
ܡ௜൨ൠ
௡෤௜ୀଵ ൐ ∑ minሾ௖ೕ∗,ܞೕ∗ሿ∈௏∗ ൜ൣ ௝ܿ∗, ܞ௝∗൧ ൤
1
ܠ௜൨ൠ
௡෤௜ୀଵ . (A.7) 
Consider a utility index such as 
 ݑ෤ሺܠሻ ൌ ∑ minሾ௖ೕ∗,ܞೕ∗ሿ∈௏∗ ቄൣ ௝ܿ∗, ܞ௝∗൧ ቂ1ܠቃቅ
௡෤௜ୀଵ . (A.7) 
It is easily verified that ݑ෤ሺܠሻ ∈ Ω௨ . Therefore, if ܇ۿ ≰ ܆, we can find a utility index such that 
∑ ݑሺܠ௜ሻ௡෤௜ୀଵ ൏ ∑ ݑሺܡ௜ሻ௡෤௜ୀଵ  holds.   
 
Next, we focus on ܆෡ and ܇෡. We define a replication matrix as follows: 
۵෡௃ ≡
ۏێ
ێێ
ۍ܍௡಺௡భሺ಻ሻ ૙ ⋯ ૙૙ ܍௡಺௡మሺ಻ሻ ⋮
⋮ ⋱ ૙
૙ ⋯ ૙ ܍௡಺௡ೝሺ಻ሻے
ۑۑ
ۑ
ې
, 
for ܫ, ܬ ∈ ሼܺ, ܻሽand ܫ ് ܬ . Using the replication matrix, we define m-by- ෤݊ሺൌ ݊௑݊௒ሻ  matrix as 
follows: 
 ܆∗ ≡ ܆෡۵෡௑, (A.9) 
 ܇∗ ≡ ܇෡۵෡௒. (A.10) 
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It should be noted that  
 ۵෡௑۵෡௑் ൌ ݊௒ ൈ diagൣ݊ଵሺ௑ሻ, … , ݊௥ሺ௑ሻ൧ ൌ ෤݊ ൈ ܁, (A.11) 
is invertible and ۵෡௑۵෡௑் ൐ ۽. Furthermore, we can consider the following block matrix 
۵෡௃ି ≡
ۏ
ێ
ێ
ێ
ێ
ۍ ଵ௡಺௡భሺ಻ሻ ܍௡಺௡భሺ಻ሻ
் ૙ ⋯ ૙
૙ ଵ௡಺௡మሺ಻ሻ ܍௡಺௡మሺ಻ሻ
் ⋮
⋮ ⋱ ૙
૙ ⋯ ૙ ଵ௡಺௡ೝሺ಻ሻ ܍௡಺௡ೝሺ಻ሻ
் ے
ۑ
ۑ
ۑ
ۑ
ې
.  
Since ۵෡௃۵෡௃ି ൌ ۷௥, we can verify that ܇∗۵෡௒ି ൌ ܇෡ holds. 
Noting that the social evaluation function defined by equation (2) is replication invariant, 
we obtain the following result: 
Lemma A2. For two distributions of attributes, ܆෡ and ܇෡, the following two conditions are equivalent. 
(1) ܇∗ۿ ൑ ܆∗ holds for some doubly stochastic matrix ۿ. 
(2) ଵ௡೉ ∑ ݊௜ሺ௑ሻݑሺܠ௜ሻ
௥௜ୀଵ ൒ ଵ௡ೊ ∑ ݊௜ሺ௒ሻݑሺܡ௜ሻ
௥௜ୀଵ   holds for all ݑ ∈ Ω௨. 
Proof. It follows from Lemma A1 and replication invariance of the social evaluation function.   
 
Now, we prove the following Lemma. 
 
Lemma A3. For two distributions of attributes, ܆෡ and ܇෡, the following two conditions are equivalent. 
(1) ܇∗ۿ ൑ ܆∗ holds for some doubly stochastic matrix ۿ. 
(2)  ܇෡ۿ෡ ൑ ܆෡܁ holds for some compressed doubly stochastic matrix ۿ෡. 
Proof.  First, suppose that ܇∗ۿ ൑ ܆∗ holds for some doubly stochastic matrix ۿ. From equations 
(A.9) and (A.10), ܇∗ۿ ൑ ܆∗ implies ܇෡۵෡௒ۿ ൑ ܆෡۵෡௑. Since ۿ is doubly stochastic, ۵෡௒ۿ۵෡௑் is a r-by-r 
nonnegative matrix whose ith row sum and ith column sum are ݊௑݊௜ሺ௑ሻ and ݊௒݊௜ሺ௑ሻ, respectively. 
Hence, we can consider a compressed doubly stochastic matrix ۿ෡ as follows: 
 ۿ෡ ൌ ଵ௡෤ ۵෡௒ۿ۵෡௑். (A.12) 
Multiplying both sides of ܇∗ۿ ൑ ܆∗ on the right by ቀଵ௡෤ቁ ۵෡௑், we obtain 
 ቀଵ௡෤ቁ ܇∗ۿ۵෡௑் ൌ ቀ
ଵ
௡෤ቁ ܇∗۵෡௒ି۵෡௒ۿ۵෡௑் ൌ ܇෡ۿ෡ ൑ ቀ
ଵ
௡෤ቁ ܆∗۵෡௑் ൌ ܆෡܁. (A.13) 
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From equation (A.13), we can confirm that (1) implies (2). Conversely, suppose that ܇෡ۿ෡ ൑ ܆෡܁ holds 
for some compressed doubly stochastic matrix ۿ෡ . Since ܆෡܁ ൌ ቀଵ௡෤ቁ ܆෡۵෡௑۵෡௑் holds, ܇෡ۿ෡ ൑ ܆෡܁ implies 
that 
 ෤݊܇∗۵෡௒ିۿ෡൫۵෡௑۵෡௑்൯ିଵ ൑ ܆෡, (A.14) 
where ൫۵෡௑۵෡௑்൯ିଵ ൌ diag ൤ ଵ௡ೊ௡భሺ೉ሻ , … ,
ଵ
௡ೊ௡ೝሺ೉ሻ൨. Multiplying both sides of inequality (A.14) on the 
right by ۵෡௑், we obtain 
 ෤݊܇∗۵෡௒ିۿ෡൫۵෡௑۵෡௑்൯ିଵ۵෡௑ ൑ ܆∗. (A.15) 
Furthermore, it can be verified that 
 ෤݊۵෡௒ିۿ෡൫۵෡௑۵෡௑்൯ିଵ۵෡௑܍௡෤் ൌ ෤݊۵෡௒ିۿ෡܍௥் ൌ ܍௡෤் , (A.16) 
 ܍௡෤ ෤݊۵෡௒ିۿ෡൫۵෡௑۵෡௑்൯ିଵ۵෡௑ ൌ ௡෤௡೉ ܖ௑൫۵෡௑۵෡௑்൯
ିଵ۵෡௑ ൌ ܍௡෤ , (A.17) 
and ෤݊۵෡௒ିۿ෡൫۵෡௑۵෡௑்൯ିଵ۵෡௑ ൒ ۽. Therefore, ෤݊۵෡௒ିۿ෡൫۵෡௑۵෡௑்൯ିଵ۵෡௑  is a doubly stochastic matrix. Thus, 
(2) implies (1).   
 
Using Lemmas A1, A2, and A3, we can confirm that ܇෡ۿ෡ ൑ ܆෡܁ ⇔ ܇∗ۿ ൑ ܆∗ ⇔ ܵ ௑ܹ ൒
ܵ ௒ܹ holds for given ܆෡ and ܇෡, and all ݑ ∈ Ω௨. 
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